Consolidation within the market for health insurance has generated significant concern that insurers are using monopsony power in a manner that is harmful to social welfare. This paper uses physician level survey data to ascertain if the ability of insurers to exercise monopsony power affects physician markets. Specifically, we look at the market for primary care physician services, and evaluate previously made assertions that public pay beneficiaries (i.e., Medicare and Medicaid) are not adequate substitutes for private pay patients in response to great private insurer monopsony power. We find no evidence that insurer market concentration changes the volume of physician services, willingness to accept new Medicare beneficiaries, or perceived Medicare reimbursement inadequacy with increased insurer concentration. However, we find significant reductions in the percentage of practice revenues originating from private payers, increased levels of acceptance of new Medicaid recipients, and reduced perception of Medicaid payment inadequacy, in response to greater insurer market concentration. We also find that insurer concentration leads physicians to integrate into multi-physician practices and find weak evidence that physicians reduce financial risk by affiliating with hospitals and accepting salaried financial arrangements. These results have implications for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) as recent evidence suggests the legislation has and will lead to increased insurer consolidation.
Introduction
In a 2003 statement to the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Hearings on Health Care Competition Law and Policy, the American Medical Association (AMA) expressed concern over the monopoly and monopsony power of health insurers. 1 The AMA argued that the growth of managed care health insurers, and their subsequent mergers, created increased financial pressure on physicians and influenced how, and if physicians treat patients. More recently, with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), the concern over insurer consolidation and competition has only intensified. In testimony before Congress, 2 Edmund Haislmaier raised concerns that increased regulation of insurers caused by the PPACA would create barriers to entry that would eliminate any new potential entrants from the market and would cause small health insurance providers to exit the market. 3 Since insurers represent a large proportion of a physician's potential customers, insurer consolidation can allow insurers to leverage their large number of enrollees and ability to steer patients to obtain significant price discounts from providers (Blair & Herndon, 2004) . This concern has come to fruition with the announcement of multi-billion dollar mergers by health insurers: Cigna and HealthSpring (October 2011); Wellpoint and Amerigroup (July 2012); and Aetna and Coventry Health Care (August 2012). 4 At first glance, price discounts from health care providers might be viewed as welfare and efficiency enhancing. For example, in markets where providers are monopolistic, monopsony insurers can counteract provider market power by acting as "monopoly busters" and use their increased market strength to reduce monopoly prices closer to competitive prices and quantities, resulting in improvements to social welfare. However, monopsony power exhibited by insurers can be welfare decreasing when providers have little market power, such as the market for physician services. When physician supply curves are upward sloping (Pauly, 1988 (Pauly, , 1998 monopsony power allows insurers to reduce prices below competitive prices, and creates incentives for insurers to reduce their purchased quantity, resulting in deadweight loss. Even if insurers force the producers of health services to provide the competitive quantity of services, as proposed in the 'all-or-none' monopsony case (Herndon, 2002) , prices are lower and the net effect is substantial lower physician income. These welfare implications are larger the greater the market share of the dominant managed care insurer (Blair & Harrison, 1992) .
Since private insurance typically has the most generous reimbursement rates, any reduction in private pay quanti-ties or prices as a result of insurer monopsony power could significantly affect physician income, and alter physician practice behavior. 5 Physicians have responded by attempting to charge patients for under-payment from private insurers, 6 trying to match monopsony power through collective bargaining, 7 consolidation of smaller practices into larger practices or under the umbrella of hospitals, and a movement away from practice ownership to a salary employee compensation model. Health insurance proponents have claimed that insurers do not have the ability to lower reimbursement rates significantly because physicians have the ability to substitute private pay patients for patients on the public programs of Medicare or Medicaid. 8 Physician advocates however, claim that Medicare and Medicaid programs are not adequate substitutes given their significantly lower reimbursement rates.
Understanding these claims and how physicians respond to insurer consolidation has only been complicated by new rules and regulations that are currently being implemented under the PPACA. The PPACA places increased financial risk on providers through changes in reimbursement mechanisms, such as Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) and bundled payments, in addition to uncertainty regarding reimbursement rates from state run health exchanges. 9 Faced with payment reform, it is predicted that many physicians will moved out of independent practice to work as salaried employees of large group practices or hospitals. 10 Therefore, the PPACA is expected to accelerate the trend towards physicians accepting salaried contracts and the consolidation of physicians into large independent or hospital owned practices.
Currently, there is a very limited empirical literature on how monopsony power of insurers affects the provision of medical services and many of the claims by physician and insurance advocates have yet to be substantiated. Existing studies are based on a formal empirical test of monopsony power proposed by Pauly (1998) to determine if managed care organizations are monopoly busting or acting as a monopsonist by studying how quantity of services provided changes in response to increased managed care market share. To date, there are only two empirical studies that implement this test. The first uses data over the period of 1985 to 1997, to analyze the price and utilization of inpatient and ambulatory care (Feldman & Wholey, 2001) . Consistent with the monopoly-busting theory, inpatient prices decline and the number of inpatient days increase with the purchasing power of managed care organizations.
However, there is no statistically significant effect for the ambulatory visit outcomes. Using more recent data from 2001 to 2004, Bates & Santerre (2008) study various measures of hospital output and find some evidence to support the monopoly-busting theory. This general lack of knowledge, suggests there is a need for understanding how monopsony power affects physician services, but also more importantly, given the increased financial pressure on providers under the PPACA, how physician financial arrangements and organization structure are affected with greater monopsony power.
Our study adds a significant contribution to the existing literature in a number of ways. The first contribution stems directly from the unit of analysis. The existing empirical work on this topic (Feldman & Wholey, 2001; Bates & Santerre, 2008) concentrate on volume of services in hospitals at a MSA level. Physician responses to managed care could be substantially different than hospitals because physicians did not undergo the same level of consolidation as the hospital industry in order to increase bargaining positions with managed care organizations. This makes the results of these studies inapplicable to physician practices. In addition, Feldman & Wholey (2001) study market level ambulatory visits but find no changes in prices or quantity in response to insurer concentration. A major limitation of this approach is the use of aggregate data given that physician practices are much more vulnerable to financial arrangements than hospitals. By using a rich dataset on physician and practice characteristics, we are able to control for these factors that potentially influence behavior, at a physician level. 11 Our second contribution is our evaluation of claims of the AMA and insurance advocates regarding supply side substitution to the publicly enrolled (i.e. Medicare and Medicaid). To our knowledge, there are no studies that empirically test the claims of the AMA or insurance advocates regarding physician substitution to the publicly insured.
Monopsony theory suggests that private pay and quantity will change with insurer concentration, so there is a chance that physicians replace some of this lost income through increases in the number of Medicare and Medicaid visits they provide. Therefore in addition to studying the total quantity of office visits provided, we determine if physicians respond to monopsony power through substitution towards patients on public insurance. Specifically, we evaluate the percentage of practice revenues from private sources, willingness to accept new Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, and the importance of public levels of reimbursement in a practices decision-making process.
The third major contribution of this study is the analysis of the impact of insurer monopsony power on the financial arrangement and organizational structure of physician practices. To our knowledge, this analysis is the first to study if increased insurer monopsony power alters the structure of primary care practices toward greater degrees of provider market power and negotiating leverage. It evaluates if insurer concentration alters the size of physician practices, ownership interest in practices by hospitals, and if physicians are more likely to enter into salaried financial arrangements. 12
Theory Monopsony: Monopsony with Competitive Health Service Supply
Initially, assume a market for health care services where both physicians and insurers behave competitively. In Figure   1 , the physician's supply curve is represented by S, the demand for health services by private insurers is represented by D p . 13 Further, assume a public health insurer with constant reimbursement rates P med that are, without loss of generality, set below competitive levels. 14 Under these assumptions, profit maximizing physicians will provide an equilibrium total of Q c health services to private insurers at a price P c . In this case, no health services will be proved to the publicly insured.
Insert Figure 1 Now, if the assumption of competitive insurers is relaxed but competition remains in the provision of health services, as health insurer concentration increases, insurers will act more like a monopsonist. Under the traditional monopsony model, concentration of buyers causes an individual buyer's purchases to influence the overall price. This influence gives rise to an upward sloping Marginal Expenditure (ME) curve which increases at a rate greater than S.
The monopsonist insurer will now purchase only Q m health services, but instead of paying the competitive price P c , the monopsonist will suppress prices lower than the competitive price. Without the presence of the public insurer, the private insurer would buy all of these units at the producer's willingness to sell (P m ). However, given the presence of the public insurer and potential substitution by the physician toward publicly enrolled, the private insurer will be forced to pay some price P such that P med < P < P c . Given the private insurer's reduction in Q, the publicly insured are now given greater access to care and Q med − Q m services are provided to patients on public insurance.
With sufficient monopsony power, the monopsonist could behave in accordance with the all-or-none model of monospony (Herndon, 2002) . This model makes the case that managed care organizations with market power do not behave as traditional monopsonists, but instead force physicians into an all or none supply curve through managed care contracts. Under this model, insurers can extract price concession by forcing physicians to accept lower prices or risk completely losing a participation contract, denying them access to a large number of patients. In Figure 1 , this could be illustrated by monopsonist insurers maintaining the level of services previously provided at Q c but through negotiation, suppressing the price below P c . 15 Under this model, producer surplus is greatly reduced, but there are no substantial changes to the quantity of visits provided to the privately insured. Thus, the all or none model implies no changes to access to care for the publicly insured. 13 Given that the market is competitive, marginal revenue for an individual physician is constant at P C . 14 This assumption is in line with either Medicare or Medicaid participation in which a provider must agree to take beneficiaries under assignment. With an assignment option, the physician must take the allowed charge, as set by Medicare as payment in full. 15 Under the all-or-none model, price could be suppressed to levels as low as average costs.
Bilateral Monopoly: Monopsony with Monopolistic Health Service Supply
Figure 2 alters the initial model such that the supply of health services becomes monopolistic and with this assumption comes the ability to price discriminate. 16 This assumption gives rise to the traditionally downward sloping marginal revenue curve for privately insured services, MR. If the initial assumption that health insurers behave competitively is maintained and that the public insurer reimburses at a rate P med , then the monopolistic health service provider will choose to provide privately insured services until MR = P med (at point c). After point c, the marginal revenue from the publicly insured becomes more attractive than privately insured patients, making the profit maximizing monopolistic health service provider's marginal revenue curve gch. Under this model, physicians will provide a total of Q phy services with Q p provided to the privately insured at a price P phy , and Q phy − Q p services provided to the publicly insured at a price of P med .
Insert Figure 2 If insurers behave monopsonistically too, the monopolist provider's market power is to some extent eroded through the introduction of monopsony power. This makes private pay price purely an issue of negotiation. Negotiated terms for reimbursement will be bound between P phy (the monopolist's privately insured profit maximizing price) and P med the lower rate guaranteed by the public insurer. Marginal revenue for the physician seeing privately insured patients now becomes constant at the negotiated rate called P neg . If P neg < P phy , visits provided to privately insured patients will be expanded (as drawn the number of visits expands to Q phy ) resulting in a reduction in access to care for the publicly insured.
Competition and Bilateral Monopoly: Incentives toward physician consolidation
Comparing the outcomes for increased monosony power of insurers when physicians behaving competitively ( Figure   1 ) vs monopolistically (Figure 2 ), it becomes apparent that physicians in the monopolistic case are provided with a better potential reimbursement outcome through negotiations. Under the competitive model, monopsonizing insurers suppress the price to P med < P < P c . Under the monopolistic physician case price is driven through negotiation to P med < P < P phy , raising the upper price bound from the competitive level to the monopolist level. Thus in response to insurer monosony, physicians are provided with an incentive to consolidate their practices or affiliate with a hospital for increased market leverage. 17 For physicians already operating in monopolistic environments, a practice merger or hospital affiliation will improve their negotiating power, pushing price closer to monopolist levels. Beyond consolidation, physicians could further isolate themselves from financial risk associated with monopsony insurers, by becoming salaried employees at these larger practice. (Bates & Santerre, 2008; Kopit, 2004; Pauly et. al., 2002) , the MSA is treated as the relevant geographic market and all non-physician specific data is reported at a MSA level.
Hypothesis

Methods
This study uses a variety of dependents variables to evaluate the effects of insurer market concentration, as measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). 19 More specifically, this study use three different measures of HHI based 18 Detailed information about the survey can be found at: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/27202/detail 19 HHI is defined as the sum of squared market shares of firms within the market. Higher values of HHI implying greater levels of market concentrations with 0 representing perfectly competitive insurers and 10,000 representing monopoly, or in the case of an insurer, a monopsony. on enrollment data: HHI for health maintenance organizations (HMOs) only, HHI for preferred provider organizations (PPOs) only, and HHI for HMOs combined with PPOs. The three different measures are used because HMOs and PPOs can be different in terms of size of provider networks, service gatekeeping, and limitations on treatment. One concern with using any measure of market structure, including HHI is endogeneity. To correct for the potential endogeneity of health insurer concentration an instrumental variables approach is employed with MSA measures of average employees per firm and number of firms used as instruments. Given that the largest share of private insurance is employer sponsored, a larger employer market should contribute to greater insurer penetration and lower insurer HHI. These instruments have been widely utilized and accepted by studies instrumenting for insurer penetration and HHI Baker & Brown, 1999; Town et. al., 2007; Bates & Santerre, 2008) . Given the statistical structure of the dependent variables, we use linear regression, negative binomial regression, or discrete choice models when appropriate. To handle the endogeneity for linear regressions, we use two-staged least squares (2SLS), 20 while for non-linear regressions, we use two-staged residual inclusion. 21 
Insurer Market Power and the Quantity of Outpatient Visits
In keeping with the existing literature, this study examines if insurer concentration affects the quantity of office visits provided by primary care physicians during their last complete work week. Under the traditional model of monopsony, it is expected that higher insurer concentration will result in a statistically significant reduction in the volume of office visits provided to privately insured patients. If there is statistically significant increase in the quantity of visits provided to privately insured patient associated with higher insurer concentration, this is consistent with the monopoly busting case. While in the all-or-none monopsony model, increased insurer concentration results in reductions in price only, with no expected changes in quantity of visits supplied to privately insured patients. Unfortunately, data for the study does not differentiate between visits provided to private and publicly insured patients. However, the evaluation of quantity still reveals vital information. If publicly insured patients are not viable substitutes for privately insured patients, then we should expect reductions in the total volume of visits in response to higher insurer market concentration. If however, the publicly insured are substituted for privately insured enrollees in response to greater monopsony power, then we could expect no change in volume of visits if physicians have time constraints. Another potential outcome if substitution occurs is an expansion in the total volume of office visits if physicians are not initially bound by time constraints and attempt to stabilize practice revenue through increased volume of the lower reimbursement, publicly insured patients. 20 2SLS is used for continous variables because in these models are treated as linear. 21 When the model specifications are nonlinear, 2SRI is utilized. S2SRI is found to be consistent in non-linear regressions where as two stage predictor substitution (2SPS) is not, making 2SRI preferred to 2SPS. See Terza et. al. for full description of 2SRI.
Insurer Market Power and Substitution toward Public Insurance
The second empirical approach is designed to examine the effects of insurer market concentration on reliance in public insurance for revenues through the percentage of practice revenues originating from private sources (i.e., not Medicare or Medicaid). The coefficient estimate of insurer concentration is essentially a test designed to detect if greater insurer market concentration (1) reduces reimbursement from private insurers (and/or) (2) causes practices to substitute publicly insured visits for privately insured visits. Given that all three models predict reductions in reimbursement with increased monopsony power, if there are no changes in the distribution in visits from the privately insured to the publicly insured, then we would expect a reduction in the percentage of revenues originating from private insurance. 22 This effect would be even more dramatic with substitution from privately insured to publicly insured patients. Finding a significant reduction in private pay revenues suggest that physicians are responding to insurer monopsony power by becoming more reliant on public payment sources for their income.
To further evaluate supply side substitution this study examines if insurer market concentration affects physicians willingness to substitute private patients for public patients and indirectly tests beneficiary access to care for both Medicare and Medicaid programs. This is done by using two physician survey variables as dependent variables related to if the physician is accepting new public patients and if these public payment sources provide adequate reimbursement. An increased willingness to accept public patients in the presence of insurer concentration, especially Medicaid patients which are reimbursed at the lowest rates, suggests that physicians are more willing to substitute private pay for public pay patients. While in the face of greater insurer concentration, a decrease in concern for the inadequacy of public reimbursement suggests that physician are more reliant on these forms of payment. The first of these variables asks physicians if their practice is accepting all, most, some, or no new Medicare (Medicaid) patients.
The second variable is asked to a subsample of physicians who are taking some or no new Medicare (Medicaid) patients. 23 Within this subsample, physicians are asked to indicate the importance of inadequate reimbursement in their decision to accept only some or no new Medicare (Medicaid) patients. In all, significant reductions in access to care measures in conjunction with increased market concentration for either Medicare or Medicaid patients would be consistent with the monopoly busting hypothesis, whereas increases in access would be consistent with the traditional theory of monopsony. No changes in access to care measures could be consistent with the all-or-none monopsony model. 22 Let P and Q be the privately insured market price and quantity, respectively. Let P med and Q med be the publicly insured market price and quantity, respectively. lim P→0 PQ PQp+P medQmed = 0 P medQmed = 0. 23 Within the survey, this question was not asked to physicians who reported accepting most or all new Medicare (Medicaid) patients.
Insurer Market Power and Physician Organizational Structure
To evaluate claims that physician organizational structure and compensation arrangements change toward increased consolidation in response to greater insurer market concentration, this study takes advantage of four variables in the survey that measure practice structure. The first dependent variable "large practice" is a binary variable that measures whether a physician surveyed worked in a practice with 100 or more physicians. The second variable, measures the number of physicians (besides the respondent) in the practice, if the total number is less than 100. Theory predicts that the exercise of monopsony power will push reimbursement from private insurers lower. Facing lower reimbursement, smaller practices operating with less efficient average cost curves may be driven to consolidate to remain profitable, or to gain more negotiating power with insurers. Thus the predicted effect of increased insurer market concentration is an increased likelihood of a working at a large practice, and an larger total number of predicted employed physicians for small practices.
Other proposed reactions to insurer consolidation and reduced reimbursement are (1) the integration of private practices with hospitals and (2) physicians reducing financial risk by entering into salaried employee compensation arrangements. Integration increases the negotiation leverage of individual physicians by creating an integrated care provider that can use the strengths of the combined entity as leverage in the negotiation process with private insurers. 24 In addition to integration, physicians may want to reduce their exposure to the financial risk and cost associated with negotiating and obtaining payment from insurers. By switching to salaried compensation arrangements, physicians can reduce this exposure, but at the same time have lower chance for upside earnings potential. To empirically evaluate these claims, this study uses a binary variable for whether a hospital has a ownership interest in the responding physician's practice, and if the responding physician is a salaried employee.
Summary of Data
Summary statistics and descriptions of control variable are provided in Table 2 . Summary statistics indicate that the average physician within the sample has approximately 15 years of experience. The summary statistics also reveal substantial variation in physician compensation arrangements that would otherwise not be detected at a more aggregate level. Seventy percent of physicians within the sample were full or partial owners at their employed practice that they work at, and approximately 50% have a salary which adjusts for performance. The majority of physicians within the sample (63% to 86%) routinely treat patients with chronic condition such as asthma, diabetes, depression, and heart failure.
HHI measures indicate a substantial variation in the overall concentration of health insurers across MSAs. From a low of 1394.09 which is below the Department of Justice guidelines for an unconcentrated market to near monopoly highs of 9996. The average physician in the sample is in a market with an HHI of 3394, which is consistent with approximately three insurers of equal size. Table 3 provides the definitions and distributions of each of the dependent variables. Table 3 indicates that the mean physician's practice obtains approximately 60% of the practices revenues from private sources and that the mean physician averages 80 office visits per week during the physician's last complete work week. Approximately 25% of the physicians within the sample were not accepting any new Medicare patients, and 43% were not accepting Medicaid patients. Of those accepting some or no new Medicare patients, 60% of physicians indicated that inadequate reimbursement was an important factor in their decision. Inadequate reimbursement was of an even greater importance in the decision of physicians who were accepting only some or no new Medicaid recipients with 80% indicating that reimbursement was very important. In terms of organizational structure, among small practices (those with less than 100 physicians) the median number of physicians indicates that 50% employed 3 or fewer physicians and that 75% employed 6 or fewer physicians. A total of 11.71% of physicians report working at a practice that employs 100 or more physicians, 31.54% of physicians indicate that a hospital has some ownership in their practice, and 71.79% of physicians report being compensated through either a fixed or performance adjusted salary. Table 4 presents a summary of the results for key HHI measures with full specifications reported in Appendix A-1 to A-10. The results reveal no significant expansion or contraction in the number of office visits in conjunction with insurer market concentration. Under the assumption that there is no supply side substitution of private pay patients for public patients in the face of insurer concentration, which was implicitly made by previous empirical studies on this topic, these results are consistent with the all-or-none model. However, in the presence of supply side substitution to Medicare or Medicaid patients, constant quantity of visits could imply expansions (reductions) in services provided to privately insured patients, with reductions (expansions) of visits provided to the publicly insured.
Results
Insert Table 4 here In order to determine if there is supply substitution, the second set of regression use the percentage of practice revenue that is generated from private sources (i.e., not Medicare or Medicaid). The results are reported in the second row of Table 4 . Despite finding small, but not statistically significant changes in the total volume of office visits, there are significant reductions in the share of practice revenues originating from private sources across all three measures of market concentration. Using the DOJ and FTC's Merger Guideline definitions for market concentration, the average marginal effects as market concentration increases from the unconcentrated (HHI=1500) to highly concentrated (HHI=2500) imply that the percentage of practice revenues originating from private sources decreasing by between 4.17 and 5.42 percentage points. The movement from highly concentrated (HHI=2500) to the respective sample average 25 HHI is associated with an additional 1.39 to 3.41 percent point reduction in the percentage of revenues from private sources. In whole, the marginal effects suggest that a movement from unconcentrated to the sample means should correspond a reduction in the percentage of practice revenues from private sources from 67.24 to 60.21 percent and implies a large shift toward greater reliance on public funding sources.
To further determine if insurer concentration induces supply-side substitution, the last four rows of Table 4 present the results of the two physician survey questions related to accepting new public patients and the adequacy of public reimbursement rates. Insurer concentration is found to have no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a practice accepting Medicare beneficiaries, but is associated with an increased likelihood of accepting Medicaid patients.
In fact, average marginal effects predict that as insurer concentration increases from unconcentrated (HHI=1500) to highly concentrated (HHI=2500), the probability of not accepting Medicaid patients decreases by 10.3 and 12.8 percentage points. Most of this increase in the probability of accepting Medicaid patients occurs in those reporting to accept all new Medicaid patients (5.20 to 6.33 percentage points).
Evaluating the importance of inadequate reimbursement in the decision to accept only some or no new Medicare patients, there are no statistically significant changes in the inadequacy of Medicare reimbursement with increased insurer market concentration. This may be due to Medicare reimbursement levels being closer to private pay reimbursement. In contrast, inadequacy of Medicaid reimbursement is found to be associated with insurer concentration as more concentrated markets have fewer physicians reporting Medicaid reimbursement rates are inadequate. The marginal effect for a unconcentrated to highly concentrated market is associated with a 2.91 to 7.91 percentage point reduction in responding "yes" to the question that the inadequacy of Medicaid reimbursement being "very" important in the decision to accept only some or no new Medicaid recipients. Inadequacy of reimbursement being "moderately", "not very", and "not at all" important in the decision to accept some or no new Medicaid patients increases by ranges of 1.63 to 4.12, 0.56 to 1.36, and 0.72 to 1.71 percentage points, respectively. This implies that increases in insurer concentration, and potentially lower private reimbursement makes Medicaid programs more attractive to physician practices.
In regards to the organizational structure of physician practices, significant coefficients infer that as insurer concentration increases from unconcentrated (HHI=1500) to highly concentrated (HHI=2500), the probability of being employed by a large practice increases for a survey physician by between 2.23 and 2.55 percentage points. Evaluating the change from unconcentrated to the respective sample means, the predicted probability of a surveyed physician being employed by a large practice increases by 4.32 to 4.49 percentage points. For small practices (total physicians <100), the increase in concentration from unconcentrated to highly concentrated implies that each small practice will 25 The sample average HHIs are 3604, 3394, and 2951 for HMOs, PPOs, and HMO/PPOs, respectively. employ two additional physicians. Moving from unconcentrated to the respective sample mean HHI's the predict marginal effects imply that each small practice will employ between 3 and 4 additional physicians. These results are consistent with physicians moving into larger group practices in response to increased financial pressure from monopsony insurers.
Hospital ownership interest in a private practice appears to increase with increased insurer market concentration as well. Of the six estimated models, five have signs consistent with this hypothesis and the significant coefficient for HMO/PPO HHI implies that as market concentration increase from unconcentrated to concentrated the probability of a hospital having some form of ownership interest in the physician's practice increases from 23.40% to 26.15% (2.73 percentage points). The total predicted percentage point change as a result of insurer concentration increasing from unconcentrated to the sample mean, implies a 3.6% increase in the likelihood of partial hospital ownership.
Evaluations of insurer concentration on the probability of salary compensation produced no statistically significant coefficients, though 4 of the 6 estimated models produced signs consistent with increased probability of salaried compensation arrangements in response to increased HHI.
Conclusions
The AMA has claimed that the increased concentration of insurers through mergers is an important concern that affects the market for physician services. Under the theory of monopsony, increased insurer concentration would results in lower private pay prices and potentially reduced quantity of private pay services, due to insurer limitations. This reduces welfare, harming patients and physicians. Insurance companies claim they have little ability to lower private pay prices because if they lowered prices, then physicians would substitute away from private pay patients and accept more patients on Medicare or Medicaid. The AMA refutes this claim, stating that the lower reimbursement rates of Medicare and Medicaid do not replace the income they would receive from private pay patients.
In an attempt to disentangle this debate, this paper used a survey of outpatient physician practices to determine if the claims of the insurance companies or AMA are more likely. The level of concentration of insurers is not found to statistically affect the number of visits a physician sees in a given week. If there is no supply-side substitution, this is consistent with the all-or-none monopsony story, but if there is supply-side substitution, then physicians are replacing private pay patients with publicly funded patients. At a minimum, this suggests that the work load of physicians has not responded to the level of insurer concentration. However, there is strong evidence that physicians in more concentrated insurer markets have a larger proportion of revenues generated from public sources. Take together with the lack of change in the number of physician visits; this would be consistent with supply-side substitution. These results are further backed by the findings that physicians in higher concentrated insurer markets are more likely to accept new Medicaid patients and are less likely to report that Medicaid reimbursement is 'very' inadequate.
What does this mean in terms of the claims of the AMA and insurance companies? Physician workloads as measured by the number of visits seem to be the same regardless of market concentration. While the AMA claims that public sources of funding are inadequate, physicians seem to be engaged in supply-side substitution. That is, if insurers squeeze physicians on private pay prices, physicians make up for this lost revenue by seeing more publicly paid patients. While these public sources reimburse at lower rates, a near monopoly insurer may be able to push prices down to the point where the trade-off between public and private patients is minimal. This implies that physicians are made worse-off by high market concentration of insurers, but public sources provide an important backstop. A backstop that will be affected by any changes to the Medicare fee schedule, the implementation of the PPACA, and state level refinements to the Medicaid system. Furthermore, under the PPACA, states are expected to create insurance exchanges which are to provide subsidized health insurance to uninsured Americans. While these exact details of these exchanges have not been worked out, there is the potential for these exchanges to have low reimbursement rates, similar to Medicaid. This further increases the importance of privately insured patients as a source of revenue for physicians.
In addition to providing some insight into the debate on insurer competition, these results have significant antitrust implications. The hospital sector has seen significant consolidation in response to the price pressures from insurance companies. For example, mergers in Cincinnati in 1994 caused hospital HHI to increase from 1238 to 2102 and mergers in Pittsburgh between 1990 to 1998 brought hospital HHI from 763 to 3506. 26 By creating concentrated hospital markets, hospitals are put in better negotiating positions to obtain higher prices from insurers and may be one reason why Bates & Santerre (2008) and Feldman & Wholey (2001) found evidence of monopoly-busting in their analysis of hospital services. In contrast, the physician market is relatively unconcentrated, and insurers can use monopsony power to extract price discounts from physicians. Without significant legislative action that increases the negotiating power of physicians, physicians have little recourse to increase private pay reimbursement. This will only increase the importance of public payment sources for physicians.
One response to the increase consolidation of health insurers is for physicians to create practices that are larger, enabling them to collectively share costs and negotiate with insurers. Furthermore, some physicians may decide to affiliate with hospitals or move to salaried employment contracts to reduce financial risk. Our results suggest that this is what is happening in more concentrated insurer markets. In essence, the physician practice is akin to mergers of hospitals, and many of the antitrust concerns associated with hospital mergers will need to be redressed when consolidation in physicians markets increase. If the predictions that the PPACA will increase insurer consolidation at a faster rate, and recent merger announcements suggest this is true, this will only enhance this consolidation of physicians practices and integration of physicians into hospitals. This implies the PPACA will increase the need of antitrust enforcement efforts not only at the insurer level, but for physician markets, similar to the hospital consolidation wave of the 1990s. 
